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By 
Daniel Daianu 
Almost ten years time of post-communist transition have elapsed. Much of the initial euphoria and illusions are 
gone. People, including the academic professionals realize that this historical endeavor is a very complex and 
complicated affair. The state of transition compels one to scrutinize more carefully the process of change, to go 
beyond stereotypes, myths, and oversimplifications. As a World Bank official working on post-communist countries 
stated, a few years ago, one should judge a policy on its own merits by skewing intellectual prejudices.2 This 
prodding was strongly reinforced by J. Stiglitz recently.3 
This paper discusses economic change in Romania and links it to two major issues: the legacy of resource 
misallocation, or what can be termed inherited structure, and institutional fragility.  The legacy of resource 
misallocation leads to very intense strain in the system when there is a brutal and dramatic change of relative prices 
to market-clearing levels.  At the new prices resources should flow from low to high productivity areas, a process 
which can generate much pain and friction in a real economy.  The strain or tension involved explains why there is 
much opposition to change, and why coalitions of interests emerge to hinder deep restructuring.  Strain also explains 
why large quasi-fiscal deficits are a feature of post-command economies, which creates an endemic proclivity to 
high inflation. 
Some analysts relate inflation, primarily, to the breakdown of the political process and rent-seeking activities by 
old elite4.  While this is not implausible, the approach adopted in this paper emphasizes the magnitude of the 
required resource reallocation, which is sometimes so large that it undermines attempts to achieve durable 
stabilization. It is arguable that the success of the leading transition economies is due, primarily, to policy being able 
to deal with the magnitude of required resource reallocation while not being ‘captured’ by vested interests. 
Institutional fragility is another dimension of the transformation process which underlines the complicated 
nature of change, restructuring included.  The lack of institutions, of organized markets, hinders a smooth 
reallocation of resources and has a negative effect on performance at both the micro and macroeconomic levels; it 
also helps to explain the intense friction in the system, especially rising transaction costs, that arises during the 
passage between two regimes.  This line of reasoning finds substantial analytical support in recent work.5 
Together with strain, institutional fragility helps to explain stop-go policies, as well as many of the setbacks and 
inconsistencies in the transition process.  Fuzziness and a lack of transparency characterize the realm of public 
finance.  For example, banks are frequently the vehicles for the granting of subsidies.  Primitive banking systems, in 
the grip of redundant structures, are likely to perpetuate much of the old pattern of resource allocation (or 
misallocation) and engage in significant quasi-fiscal operations, with the latter showing up in high rates of inflation 
or of bank failures. 
                                                          
1 Paper presented at the Fifth Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies, “Ten Years of 
Transition: What Have We learned and What Lies Ahead”, Dubrovnik, 23-25 June, 1999. This paper 
relies heavily on the author’s previous research and his work for the UN/EEC, in early 1999. In this 
respect see the section on Romania in Economic Survey of Europe, UN/EEC, Geneva, no.1, 1999, 
pp. 70-81  
2A. Gelb (1996),  “From Plan to Market: A Twentyeight Country Adventure”, Transition, vol.7, np.5-6, 
p.2  
3 J. Stiglitz remarked that the failures of reforms “are not just due to sound policies being poorly 
implemented…failures go deeper, to a misunderstanding of the foundations of a market economy as 
well as a misunderstanding of the basics of an institutional reform process” (“Whither Reform? Ten 
Years of Transition” paper prepared for the  Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, 
Washington DC, 28-30 April, 1999). One need not fully agree with Stiglitz in order to see that he has a 
point. 
4Boone, P. and J. Hoerder (1998), “Inflation: Causes, Consequences, and Cures” in P. Boone, S. 
Gomulka and R. Layard (eds), Emerging from Communism. Lessons from Russia, China and Eastern 
Europe, pp. 42-72. 
5 Blanchard, O. (1997), The Economics of Post-communist Transition, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
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Romania’s experience is a highly relevant example of how strain and institutional fragility condition 
macroeconomic stabilization. 
In the following analysis of economic developments during 1990-1998, stop-go policies, resurgent inflation and 
macro-disequilibria, as well as bank failures, all emerge as an inevitable outcome of a feeble pace of restructuring 
and fragile institutions.  It is emphasized that without large inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
creation of appropriate institutions, the economy is unlikely to be able to escape from the grip of the old structures.  
It is also clear that a more rapid rate of privatization would help to increase the inflow of foreign capital.  The slow 
pace of restructuring has maintained intense strain in the system and has led to a bad “path dependency”.  Romania 
started the transition process at a disadvantage, with significantly worse initial conditions than those prevailing in the 
leading reform countries,6 which suggests that her policy-makers have also had less room for maneuver7.  
Nonetheless, the end result is that they have not yet been able to find a clear way forward to a well-functioning 
market economy.  Under the current unfavorable conditions in the world economy it will be increasingly difficult for 
the Romanian economy to escape from this path dependency. 
Part one deals with two major underplayed issues: institutional fragility; and the magnitude of the required 
resource reallocation, which engenders the so-called strain.  Part two focuses on economic developments in 
Romania between 1990—1998. Part three contains final conclusions. 
1. Two major underplayed issues 
 
There are two issues, which are of utmost importance for coming to grips, analytically and 
operationally, with the reality of post-communist transformation; both, in my view, have been 
underestimated. One issue regards the relative backwardness of the former command systems and a 
related institutional fragility; the other issue refers to the magnitude of required resource reallocation in 
relation to the new relative prices dictated by liberalization and opening of the economy. 
1.1 The legacy of backwardness 
Knowledgeable professionals can often be heard making judgements on the transformation process, while 
seeming to neglect the legacy of backwardness of most of these societies – a state of affairs which goes back deeply 
into history. A note of caution is nevertheless required. The post-communist societies of Europe are societal entities 
that show common (structural) traits, but also major discrepancies; the latter can be linked with the different pre-
communist legacies (the former Czechoslovakia, as a leading industrial country during the inter-war period, is the 
most conspicuous example) and the different brands of national central planning, in terms of relaxation of direct 
controls and economic policy choices. The different histories explain widely different incomes per capita (with 
Romania as one of the poorest post-communist countries in Europe), why market institutions vary qualitatively 
among the national environments and why macro and micro-disequilibria differed among them on the eve of 1989. 
Undoubtedly, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia and Poland had a substantial competitive edge in starting the 
process of managing transition. Unsurprisingly, all these countries have fared better than the rest in their stabilization 
programs, although their recipes were not similar, as some would argue. 
Backwardness should be seen as bearing considerably on the potential for overcoming the performance deficit 
of societies with poor institutional arrangements; it points, on one hand, at the lack of specific knowledge of 
individuals and of society as a whole and at the constraints for genuine institutional change and, on the other hand, it 
suggests that there is much scope for a system to get outside what can be conceived as an ideal tunnel of evolution. 
The stress put on the burden of the past is meant to warn against its dragging effects and an unfavorable path 
dependency, from which it may not be easy to break away. 
Backwardness makes it harder to overcome the fragility of the emerging market institutions and enhances the 
potential for the dynamics of change to get out of control. Institutional fragility was much underestimated by 
policymakers and their advisers.8 
                                                          
6Romania practised late Stalinism until the very end of the communist regime. Initial conditions can be 
related to the magnitude of resource misallocation, the institutional ingredients of a market 
environment, the existence of a private sector, to a certain industrial culture, etc.  
7 See also S. Estrin, M. Dimitrov, and X. Richet, “State Enterprise Restructuring in Bulgaria, Albania 
and Romania”, Economic Analysis, vol.1, no.3, 1998, pp. 239-255. The authors conclude that “ when 
one looks at differences in terms of progress of restructuring it seems likely that these can best be 
explained by preconditions than current progress in reforms” (pp.250) 
8 As Peter Rutland rightly points out ‘in a travesty of Hayekian logic, it was assumed that market 
institutions would be self-generating’, “Has Democracy failed Russia?”, The National Interest, winter,  
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Similarly inadequate is the neglect of the extreme complexity of the process under way. Gross 
oversimplifications and reductionism of the type ‘black vs. white’ (with no shades in-between), and the lack of 
understanding of how interests are socially articulated – particularly in a transition period – cannot but obscure real 
processes and lead to hasty and inadequate decisions. ‘The elite failed to understand that society was a far more 
complex organism than what they had thought, that simple, well-meaning declarations were not effective in politics, 
that ideas and programmes would have to be sold to the public, and that institutions were necessary for the routinised 
exercise of power’ 9. Besides, ‘Imperfect and costly information, imperfect capital markets, imperfect competition: 
these are the realities of market economies – aspects that must be taken into account by those countries embarking 
on the choice of an economic system’10. The implication is clear in the sense of the stringent need to consider how 
market economies actually function. 
On a more general level it is high time to take cognizance of an extremely important fact: the post-communist 
countries are in a period when the basic constructs of the future systems are put in place and this can be seen as an 
historical opportunity for designing viable societal aggregates.  
The sintagma of institutional fragility has already been implied. Apart from the insufficient analytical attention 
paid to the institutional build-up in the transforming societies in Europe, one has to consider the seeds of instability 
produced by this fragility. The poor capacity of immature institutions to perform needs to be mentioned in this 
context. For example, the debate on universal vs. narrow banks (on whether and how banks should be involved in 
resource allocation) is quite relevant for the concern immature market institutions create in terms of enhancing 
instability and uncertainty in the system11.  
From a broader perspective one can pose the issue of the governance capabilities of the political and economic 
elites of these countries – to what extent these elites are capable to induce and manage change (transformation) when 
so much fuzziness, volatility and uncertainty is prevailing. One can also assume that institutional fragility will bear 
significantly on the nature of capitalism in the region. 
1.2 The magnitude of resource reallocation: the emergence of strain 
Another issue which is not sufficiently highlighted in the professional and public debate is the dimension of the 
inherited misallocation of resources– i.e. the sheer scale of disequilibria, at the new relative prices, that indicates the 
magnitude of required restructuring as compared to the ability of the system to undergo wide-ranging and quick 
change. The structure of the economy, the legacy of resource misallocation, have put the system under exceptional 
strain once the combination of the internal shocks (engineered by reforms, or, simply, triggered by the uncontrolled 
processes of system dissolution) and external shocks occurred. Appendix 1 provides an analytical explanation of 
strain, which is buttressed by an empirical analysis done by OECD experts.   
At the dramatically changed relative prices and should financial discipline be strictly imposed many enterprises 
(the inefficient ones) would have to be out of the economic circuit; they may try to survive by reducing X-
inefficiency12 but, in the end, should potential efficiency gains be evenly distributed (ubiquitous), they would have to 
bow out. To put it in short, the array of structurally inefficient enterprises forms a silent ‘conspiracy’ against change; 
they represent entrenched personal stakes, which oppose restructuring for obvious reasons. Together with other 
factors (including insufficient policy credibility) the lack of capacity to pay triggers a chain reaction of inter-
enterprise debt, of arrears. The latter can be seen as temporary quasi-inside money, which undermines the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.13 Appendix 2 uses a simple model in order to illustrate how arrears affects 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1994/95, p.11. 
9 G. Schopflin, “Post-communism: The Problems of Democratic Construction”, Daedalus, vol.123, 
no.3, summer, 1994, pp. 130  
10 J. Stiglitz, “Whither Socialism”, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1995, pp. 267 
11 One can talk about an enhanced “financial instability hypothesis”, in the vein of H. Minsky’s, “ A 
Theory of Systemic Fragility” ( in E.I.Altman and A.W.Semetz (eds.): “Financial Crises: Institutions and 
Markets in a Fragile Environment”, New York, John Wiley and Sons). 
12 H. Leibenstein, “Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency”, American Economic Review, vol.56, no.3, 
pp. 392-410, 1966 
13 If the equation of exchange (PY=MV) is put in a dynamic form by using logarithms: vmyp &&&& +=+ ; 
where  and  are the rates of change of prices, output, money supply and money velocity, 
respectively. When monetary policy is tightened, m , and 
m ,y ,p &&& v&
0=& ( )y+p &&
p&
 is above zero,  needs to be 
positive in order to alleviate the expected decline of output. In this case, arrears appear as if they 
modify money velocity. If arrears are considered temporary quasi-inside money and velocity is kept 
constant, the relationship becomes  (c, a), where c is cash and bank credit and (a) 
represents arrears. When  because of the dear money policy, . See D.Daianu (1994), 
v&
m=y+p &&&
0=c& a=y+ &&
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stabilization policy. Arrears reduce the relevance of low official budgets deficits - since quasi-fiscal deficits are 
large. It should be said that quasi-fiscal deficits have been looming ominously over economic policy in Romania in 
the years of transformation. 
What are the major implications of strain? One is that these economies can easily become exceedingly unstable 
and that their capacity to absorb shocks is quite low; these economies have a high degree of vulnerability! Another 
implication is that policymakers face extremely painful trade-offs and that, in most cases, unless policy is clever and 
sufficient external support is available, the room for maneuver is in practice, quite limited. Finally, macroeconomic 
stabilization in certain countries hides deeply seated tensions which, sooner or later, come into the open unless deep 
restructuring takes place. 
Strain needs to be seen in relationship with unemployment. Current unemployment rates in the transforming 
economies are not exceedingly high in comparison with the European levels of the mid-nineties and this could 
assuage the perception of strain. However, the yardstick used is itself questionable taking into account the 
unemployment problem in Western Europe. Secondly, the weakness of safety nets acquires particular significance in 
the poorer post-communist countries, where the consequences of a ‘new type’ of poverty could be extremely 
serious14. And another factor is the fact that restructuring of large companies – which mostly need to shed labour in 
order to become profitable – is very slow, or, in practice, not taking place; this means that potential unemployment 
increases are still very significant. 
Strain should be linked also with an intense distribution struggle, and an erosion of the consensus for societal 
change when many individuals appear as losers – once market forces start to reward people in accordance with 
merit, effort, good ideas, and inspiration, but also as a result of some workers’ misfortune to have jobs in bad 
(unprofitable) enterprises. This also explains why some governments see inflation as a redistribution device when 
strain is extreme. 
There is another dimension to this distribution struggle which needs to be highlighted for its exceptional 
character in human history, and for its effects on system transformation. It is the process of privatization, which 
means a massive (total) redistribution of state assets. As we know, economic textbooks take as a given the initial 
distribution of assets among individual private owners; this distribution is almost God given, and it underpins the 
whole reasoning on how best to allocate resources and achieve Pareto optimality  (highest welfare). In the case of 
post-communist countries, ‘God’ has decided to come down from heaven – for what we are witnessing currently is 
an extraordinary process, without precedent in the history of mankind. In the next few years, much of the fate of 
tens, if not hundreds, of millions of living individuals (and of their descendants) is going to be shaped by the 
mechanics and dynamics of privatization. What took many hundreds of years in the advanced capitalist countries is 
supposed to occur, through various procedures (more or less legal), in the post-communist countries, in a snapshot 
on the scale of history. It is not, therefore, surprising that everything surrounding this process is so highly charged 
emotionally – why so many hopes, dreams, reckless and ruthless actions, misbehavior, and delusions are linked to it. 
All individuals want to be on the winning side, but markets cannot make them all happy. 
The nature of capitalism in the post-communist countries will be decisively influenced by the actual results of 
privatisation as a process. If privatisation results in the development of a strong middle class as the social backbone 
of the new economic system, stability and vigour will be secured, and democratic institutions will develop. 
Otherwise, the new system in the making will be inherently unstable. 
There is a feature of communism that needs to be emphasized in order to understand better the social tension 
engendered by post-communist transformation, and the intensity of the distribution struggle. Communism – as an 
economic system – functioned as a kind of poor and steadily declining (suffering from economic euthanasia) but, 
nonetheless, ‘premature welfare state’15. As in Western countries, where there exist powerful vested interests which 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“Inter-enterprise Arrears in a Post-command Economy. Thoughts from a Romanian Perspective” ,  
IMF Working Paper, 94/54. For the history of arrears in Romania see also Clifton, E.V. and M. S. 
Khan (1993), “Interenterprise arrears in Transforming Economies. The Case of Romania”, IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol.40, No.3, pp.680-696. C. Carare and E.R.Perotti argue that arrears, in Romania, are a 
result of inconsistent reform policies and the underdevelopment of financial markets (“The Evolution 
of Bank Credit Quality in Romania since 1991”, in S. Zecchini (ed.), “Lessons from the Economic 
Transition”, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic, 1997, pp.301-314). Consequently, they argue in favour of 
hardening budget constraints. But, as other analysts, they do not explain why reform policy is 
inconsistent and the structure of incentives for banks so hard to change. Thence comes the relevance 
of strain.  
14About labor hysteresis and its implications for Romania see J.S. Earle, C. Pauna, “Incidence and 
Duration of Unemployment in Romania”, European Economic Review, 40, 1996, pp.829-837 
15    J. Kornai, “Lasting growth as a top priority”,  Discussion Paper no.7, Budapest, Collegium, 
Institute for Advanced Study  
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oppose economic adjustment, in post-communist countries those who cannot compete on the markets have turned 
into a coalition of interests which can slow down, or even arrest reforms. This mass of individuals is most likely to 
fall prey to populist slogans. Robert Gilpin’s observation, that adjustment is very difficult in welfare states, applies 
mutatis mutandis in the case of post-communist countries16. 
 
2. Judging Romania’s economic transition 
2. 1  The burden of the past 
 
In comparative analyses of the transition economies insufficient attention has been paid to the initial 
conditions prevailing when the transformation process got under way.17  Communist Romania, 
particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, provides an interesting and instructive case of “immiserising-
growth” which was caused by the logic of the system, in particular, the rush to speed up industrial 
growth and to increase ties with market economies on a very weak functional basis (by totally ignoring 
market mechanisms).  In the literature, this phenomenon is explained by the existence of various price 
distortions which harm resource allocation, worsen the terms of trade, and lower  welfare.18  But it can 
also be argued that it was the way the economy functioned as a whole (including the genesis of wrong 
industrial choices) which constituted the distortion that led to immiserising growth.  It has been shown 
that the inner dynamics of the system - its incapacity to cope with increasing complexity and its 
inability to assimilate and generate technological progress - led to a “softening” of output, 
characterized by its expansion with a strong bias towards low value-added industrial goods, which led 
to a steady deterioration of the terms of trade.19 
Since “immiserising growth” limited the potential to increase exports, the targeted trade surpluses in 
the 1980s – required to pay back the external debt – were achieved through very large cuts in hard 
currency imports.  Apart from the reduced level of investment, growth possibilities were also impaired 
by a sharp reduction in imports of machinery and equipment from the western countries.  The heavy 
overtaxation of domestic absorption that took place during this period subsequently resulted in lower 
growth rates of production, reduced welfare (consumption), and bigger domestic imbalances (both 
visible and hidden).  In addition, shortages were rising in both production and consumption. 
The immiserising nature of “growth” in communist Romania is well illustrated by its income per capita 
(which has remained one of the lowest in Europe) and the very high energy intensity of its GDP.20  
Another telling fact is that whereas the GDP grew allegedly by almost 28 per cent during the 1980s 
exports decreased over the same period. 
The structure of industry also revealed a strong bias towards the creation of gigantic units, with no 
regard for the important sources of flexibility in an economy, namely, the small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  Thus, in 1989, 1,075 enterprises with more than 1,000 employees each, represented more 
than 51 per cent of all units, provided jobs for 87 per cent of all industrial workers and supplied almost 
85 per cent of all industrial output; enterprises with over 3,000 workers (which accounted for about 16 
per cent of the total) supplied over 50 per cent of total industrial output and provided jobs for 53 per 
cent of all employees in industry.  At the same time, the small and medium-sized enterprises (with less 
than 500 employees) accounted for 4 per cent of all workers and 6 per cent of total industrial output. 
                                                          
16 R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International relations”, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1987  
17An IMF report of 1997 acknowledges that “Romania emerged from communism with an economy 
that was suffering from considerably more deep-seated structural problems than most former 
communist countries in the region”.  IMF, ‘Romania – Recent Economic Developments’, IMF Staff 
Country Reports No. 97/46, Washington D.C., 1997, (p.7). 
18Bhagwati, J., “Immiserising Growth – a Geometrical Note”, Review of Economic Studies, 25, June, pp. 
201-205.  Johnson, H., “The Possibility of Income Losses from Increased Efficiency of Factor 
Accumulation in the Presence of Tariffs”, Economic Journal, vol.77, pp. 151-154. 
19 Daianu, D. (1985), “A Case of Immiserising Growth”, Revista Economica, 20 (in Romanian). 
20The energy consumption per unit of GDP is in Romania twice as high as in Hungary, and more than 4 
times larger than the OECD average (EBRD, Transition Report, 1995, London, p.77). 
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The forced reduction of the external debt in the 1980s (actually a sui generis shock-therapy), 
accentuated the decline in the competitiveness of the economy, exacerbated imbalances among sectors, 
increased shortages, and generally lowered the welfare of the people. 
2.2  The high inflation period, 1990-1993 
The early years of post-communism in Romania were marred by severe economic difficulties, 
including a very large fall in output (table 1), an institutional interregnum,21 and “systematic” policy 
incoherence. Institutional hiatus refers to the melting down of much of the old institutional structures 
without a rapid build up of market-based institutions.  This, obviously, contributed to increasing 
uncertainty, fuzziness, and volatility in the national economic environment.  At this stage the 
entrenched structures are being broken and changed, which means that the quantity of friction in the 
system goes up considerably and important energies (resources) are consumed in order to 
accommodate change.  A lot boils down to a change of the organizational behavior of actors, to the 
build-up of new organizational capital.  In this phase of transition there exists a territory over which 
...market coordination failures combine with an “abandoned child” feeling of many enterprises, which 
are no longer able to rely on central allocation of resources and customers.  For these enterprises 
information and transaction costs skyrocketed.22 
In spite of its tortuous path some institutional change did take place during those years; through 
spontaneous processes, such as massive land privatization and the emergence of a private sector (which 
preceded Law 54 of 1990 on the setting up of private enterprises),23 as well as measures “from above” 
initiated by Government.  Among the latter are the start of the two-tiered banking system (in 1990), the 
commercialization of state-owned enterprises (Law 15 of 1990), and the privatization Law 58 of 1991 
which aimed at giving 30 per cent of the equity of commercial companies to Romanian citizens.24  
What happened with the privatization law is symptomatic of the vacillations and inconsistencies of 
reform policies during that period; Law 58 of 1991 created much confusion regarding the actual 
structure of property rights and the need for enhanced management of assets.  What was lacking was a 
concern for building institutionally organized markets for factors of production. 
Overall and in a formal sense, it can be said that policy-makers practiced a sort of “institutional 
mimetism” by trying to adopt, although in a highly inconsistent way, institutions found in the western 
world.  A problem with institutional mimetism, however, is that it cannot deal with the fine print of 
reforms (institutional change) and, frequently, it lacks substance since the real functioning of 
institutions is driven by vested interests. 
After December 1989 there was tremendous pressure from below to consume tradeables, to reduce 
exports and boost imports of both consumer and intermediate goods, after the years of severe 
deprivation in the 1980s.  The switch in favor of tradeables was almost instantaneous and virtually 
unstoppable; it was also strengthened by a “shunning of domestic goods” syndrome.  In 1990 the boost 
in consumption was financed primarily by dissaving (the depletion of foreign exchange reserves). 
However, there is another side of the story that needs to be highlighted, namely, that policy-makers 
complicated the state of the economy both by commission and omission.  By commission, since they 
faltered in the face of pressures from below and were influenced also by the prospect of elections in 
May 1990.  This resulted in the concession of large wage rises25 and the introduction of the five-day 
                                                          
21 See also Kozul-Wright, R. and P. Rayment, ‘The institutional hiatus in economies in transition and 
its policy consequences’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.21, No.5 (September 1997), pp. 641-
661. 
22 Daianu, D. (1994), “The Changing Mix of Disequilibria during Transition. A Romanian Background””, 
IMF Working Paper, 94/73. See also S. Estrin et. al. (ibid., p. 249) 
23In 1991 the number of private companies rose quickly to 72,277; they operated mainly in trade and 
services.  By the end of 1995 the number had risen to almost half a million.  It should be recalled that, in 
contrast with Hungary or Poland, the communist regime in Romania did not allow any form of private 
property. 
24It should be said that commercial companies represented only 60 per cent of state assets; the rest 
belonged to the so called ‘régies autonomes’, which were created according to the French model. 
25This development should be seen in the context of the elections in May 1990.  Measured real wages 
rose by 11 per cent between December 1989 and October 1990, while output continued to fall.  The 
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workweek, despite the fact that output was plummeting, together with the maintenance of wide-ranging 
price controls, a greatly overvalued exchange rate, and mismanagement of the foreign exchange 
reserves.  By omission, for there were no serious attempts to deal with macroeconomic imbalances 
before November 1990.  Events during that year revealed a fundamental flaw in the transformation 
process, namely, the considerable decision-making power of enterprises when they do not face hard-
budget constraints. 
Confronted with a rapid deterioration of the economy and unable to contain growing disequilibria 
(unsustainable trade deficits, rising prices, vanishing investment) a stabilization plan, supported by the 
IMF, was introduced at the start of 1991.26  The middle-of-the-road, gradualistic stabilization 
programme that took shape included the following: a tightening of fiscal and monetary policy 
(although real interest rates remained highly negative), a tax-based incomes policy, a new devaluation 
and introduction of a two-tier exchange rate system (through the initiation of an interbank foreign 
exchange auction system, in February 1991).  The programme failed to stop inflation. 
At the end of 1991 there were growing tensions in the system: for example, an overvalued official 
exchange rate; artificially low prices for energy and raw materials which encouraged their 
overconsumption; and insufficient inflows of foreign capital to compensate for the low levels of 
domestic saving and the weakness of fixed investment.  Many exporters and importers found a way out 
of the impasse in making barter deals, which introduced an implicit exchange rate into the functioning 
of the economy; this rate mitigated the pernicious effects of overvaluation but entailed considerable 
information and transaction costs.  However, capital flight and insufficient exports were becoming 
matters of major concern. 
In the spring of 1992 policy-makers were compelled to act.  Interest rates were raised considerably, the 
refinance rate of the National Bank reaching 80 per cent; the exchange rate was devalued substantially 
and exporters were granted full retention rights in the hope of overcoming their mistrust of policy-
makers and encouraging the repatriation of capital.  The full retention measure was thought necessary 
since enterprises still had a vivid memory of the “confiscation” of their hard-currency holdings at the 
end of 1991.  But the policy turnaround was incomplete and interest rates remained negative as a result 
of a large array of preferential credits and very low deposit rates - the latter reflecting a high propensity 
to shun the domestic currency in favor of the dollar.  Political factors, resulting from the elections of 
September 1992, also weakened the determination of the government to pursue a consistent policy. 
 
Table 1     Macroeconomic indicators, 1990-98 
Indicators  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1.GDP (annual change) % -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.6 - 7..3
2. Unemployment rate 
(end of period) 
% - 3 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.6 8.8 10.3
3.Inflation 
   -average 
   -Dec./Dec. 
 
% 
% 
5.1
37.7
170.
2
222.
8
210.
4
199.
2
256.
1
295.
5
136.
7
61.7
 
32.3 
27.8 
 
38.8 
56.9 
154.
8
151.
4
59.1
40.6
                                                                                                                                                                                    
removal of price controls began in November of that year. 
26 See also Demekas, D. G.  and M. S. Khan (1991), “The Romanian Economic Reform Program”, 
IMF Occasional Paper, No.89 
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4.M2 (end of period)- 
growth rate 
% 22 101.
2
79.6 141 138.
1
71.6 66 104.
9
48..9
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6 
9.5 -22.2 6
    
* Consolidated budget 
** Exchange rate variation deflated by the ratio between Romanian PPI and US PPI 
Source: National Bank of Romania 
2. 3  A policy breakthrough, 1993-1994: “the interest rate shock” 
Rising inflation and the persistence of a large trade imbalance eventually forced a reconsideration of policies.  A 
breakthrough occurred in the last quarter of 1993 when several key decisions were made in order to contain and 
reverse the dynamics of inflationary expectations, to start the remonetisation of the economy and to create a 
transparent, functioning foreign exchange market.  The major omission in the whole strategy, however, was 
privatization, which would have had a major influence on the size of capital inflows and on the scope and intensity 
of restructuring. 
The main decision, a dramatic rise in nominal interest rates, led to positive real interest rates.  Thus, the National 
Bank’s average refinancing rate rose from an annual rate of 59.1 per cent in September 1993 to 136.3 per cent in 
January 1994 and remained at that level for another three months.  Commercial banks’ lending rates followed suit 
with a two-month lag.  This measure had two major consequences: first it stemmed the flight from the leu and 
started a rapid rate of remonetization; and, second, it greatly helped the formation of a transparent foreign exchange 
market and, thereby, strengthened the potential for an export drive.  The scale of remonetization explains why the 
policy shock of 1994 did not lead to a decline of output as was the case in 1997 (when the economy was subject to a 
credit crunch). 
Another key decision was the substantial devaluation (in several stages) of the official (inter-bank market) 
exchange rate which lowered it to more or less the rate prevailing on the grey market; this also increased the 
transparency of the foreign exchange market which in turn reduced considerably the entry costs for those in need of 
foreign exchange. 
The third measure involved a stricter control of base money and consequently a reduced rate of money creation.  
And finally, the fiscal stance was tightened to aim at a low budget deficit when corrected for the removal of explicit 
and implicit subsidies.27 
The results of this policy breakthrough were much as expected. Inflation fell to an annual rate of 62 per cent 
(December on December) in 1994 and there was a large reduction in the trade deficit to $411 million.28  The 
                                                          
27The budget deficit was actually higher in 1994 (4.3 per cent) than in 1993 (1.7 per cent), but many 
implicit and explicit subsidies had been removed, which was a key objective. 
28It can be argued, however, that the ceteris paribus condition does not apply in this assessment since 
there were favorable external ‘shocks’ as well. 
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economy absorbed the shock of high positive real interest rates and of the exchange rate unification which meant the 
suppression of some implicit and explicit subsidies to inefficient producers – and there was no decline of output.  
The removal of implicit subsidies explains why the budget deficit went up to 4.3 per cent in 1994, with a large part 
of its financing being obtained from external sources.   
The export drive played a major role in the recovery, but it cannot explain why so many enterprises in the weak 
sectors also did well in 1993, especially as arrears did not “appear” to be rising sharply in 1994.29  Several 
explanations can be suggested.  One is the existence of important market imperfections, such as monopolies that can 
extract rents and which operate in the less efficient sectors.  Another is that there are huge amounts of “X-
inefficiency” in the system. This means that potential micro-efficiency gains are ubiquitous and that, when under 
pressure, even firms in the backward sectors can realize some of them and cope with the situation.  But accepting 
this explanation requires an evaluation of the resilience of organizational routines in the system.  An implication of 
the X-inefficiency explanation is that the pressure for fundamental restructuring begins to bite only when most of the 
efficiency reserves are exhausted.  A third explanation is that there was more reliance on self-financing, although in 
fact many companies were plagued by a lack of working capital.  Last, but not least, unwarranted bank lending 
(rollover of loans) may have played a significant role in supporting the weaker enterprises. 
2. 4   Fragile growth and relapse into inflation, 1995-1996 
In 1995 there was a rapid growth of GDP in Romania, 7.1 per cent against just under 4 per cent in 1994 and 
under 2 per cent in 1993; at the same time the inflation rate at the end of 1995 was about 28 per cent.  The 
remonetization of the economy continued, as indicated by the expansion of the money supply (71 per cent) far 
exceeding the rate of inflation (table .1). While exports continued to grow rapidly (by over 20 per cent) imports 
increased by more than 30 per cent, causing the trade imbalance to increase again to more than $1,200 million and 
putting pressure on the foreign exchange (inter-bank) market. 
What caused the trade imbalance to deteriorate again, bearing in mind that the real exchange rate did not 
appreciate in 1995 (although it did so in the second half of 1994) and that there were no major changes in the terms 
of trade in this period?  One explanation is that an import and consumer spending boom started in the last months of 
1994, which, arguably, might have been encouraged by perceptions that the exchange rate was unsustainable.  But 
this explanation would have to be reconciled with the fact that in 1994 the trade and current account imbalances 
improved dramatically and the foreign exchange reserves of the banking system (including the Central Bank) 
increased substantially, which might have suggested that the exchange rate was in fact sustainable.  It is also possible 
that the various economic agents were unused to stability of the nominal exchange rate and therefore anticipated an 
inevitable depreciation which, paradoxically, may not have been justified by the economic fundamentals.  Another 
conjecture is that some of the improvement in the trade balance in 1994 was caused by temporary factors; their 
removal in the following year then put additional pressure on an exchange rate that was already overvalued.  
Without dismissing these factors, the more important explanation is probably that the higher growth rate of the 
economy, driven by highly import-dependent branches, led to overheating and the rapid growth of imports. 
In 1996 there was a clear link between inflation and the way the budget deficit was financed.  Whereas the target 
for the consolidated budget deficit was 2.2 per cent, it turned out to be 5.7 per cent, on an accrual basis.  More 
significant was that its financing was inflationary as a result of the commercial banks buying an increasing volume 
of three month T-bills.  The scale of inflationary financing was augmented by the injection of base money in order to 
cover the quasi-fiscal deficit which arose because of the losses of agriculture and of the régies autonomes.  Together 
with the quasi-fiscal deficit the fiscal imbalance reached 8.4 per cent (on an accrual basis) in 1996 (table 2). 
The process of remonetization had supported the efforts to subdue inflation in 1994 and 1995.  Regarding 
remonetization several aspects should be emphasized: 
a) it facilitated the subsidisation of various sectors of the economy (agriculture, energy) from the Central Bank’s 
resources, allowing the Central Bank to pursue simultaneously the reduction of inflation.  The sectoral financing 
mirrored the existence of major structural disequilibria in the economy; 
b) it “helped” put off dealing resolutely with the two failed banks - Dacia Felix and Credit Bank; more then 
1,700 billion lei (c. $400 million) were injected in both through special credits during 1995-1996.  If money demand 
had not grown for most of 1995 and 1996 the size of the special credits would have certainly fuelled inflation.  The 
reason for this injection was that there was no insurance scheme for small depositors and so it was felt necessary to 
forestall a run on the banks, and, therefore, a possible systemic crisis; 
c)  it involved the expansion of base money through the increase of net domestic assets, and not through the 
accumulation of net foreign assets. Ideally, remonetization should have taken place as an outcome of a rise in net 
                                                          
29Caution is required with the numbers since arrears can be obscured by inefficient activities being 
kept afloat by bank lending (via rollovers).  Ultimately, these ‘hidden’ arrears will show up in a 
deterioration in the portfolios of the banks.  This is what appears to have happened in 1996 and 
thereafter. 
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foreign assets - that is, as a result of capital inflows or of net exports and not, primarily, via base money injections 
which supported the expansion of domestic credit; 
d) it can be argued that this remonetization slowed down the development of monetary policy instruments, 
namely open market operations.  This is because the Central Bank did not face the pressure to cope with a surge of 
liquidity as would have been the case with substantial capital inflows.  The main reasons why such inflows did not 
occur are the feeble pace of privatization during 1994-1996, the poor functioning of the domestic capital markets, 
and the credibility problem surrounding domestic policies. 
By the end of 1996 several worrying tendencies had emerged: a very sharp rise in the monthly inflation rate 
which was in double-digits in the last quarter of the year; the sharp rise in the trade and current account deficits, 
although the growth rate of GDP was lower than in 1995 (3.9 per cent as against 7.1 per cent); and still greater 
distortions in relative prices due, especially, to the delay in adjusting energy prices and to the administrative control 
of the exchange rate.  Overall, the macroeconomic stabilization programme was losing steam.  The inflation rate at 
the end of the year was 57 per cent.  Furthermore, in spite of heavy borrowing (over $1.5 billion) on the international 
capital markets,30 the foreign exchange reserves of the National Bank stood at about $700 million at the end of 1996.  
The external debt of the country was rising rapidly with peak payments looming in the following years.  In addition, 
the policy mix being pursued by the Government (multiple exchange rates, price controls, subsidies, etc) was 
making it unlikely that it would be possible to reach a new arrangement with the IMF.  Such developments were 
clearly leading to a dead-end and a policy change was urgently required. 
The events of 1995 and 1996 underscored both the importance of privatization for inducing autonomous capital 
inflows and for enhancing restructuring, as well as the danger of “populist macroeconomics”.31 
Table 2. Fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits 
As per cent share in GDP 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Budget balance  
Total  
     Cash -0.4 -1.9 -2.6 -3.9 -4.5
     Accruals  -0.4 -1.9 -3.0 -5.8 -3.5
Primary  
     Cash 80.6 -0.5 -1.2 -2.2 -0.5
     Accruals 0.6 -0.5 -1.6 -4.1 0.5
Quasi-fiscal deficit 
NBR refinancing 
-3.1 -3.6 -0.3 -2.6 0.0
                                                          
30During 1995 Romania was rated BB- by the principal western rating agencies (and BB+ by JCRA), 
which helped the raising of money on the international capital markets.  These accommodating capital 
inflows fended off a major balance of payments crisis in 1996. 
31The elections of 1996 clearly had an impact on macroeconomic policy and, subsequently, on the 
performance of the economy. 
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Budget balance including quasi-fiscal deficit 
Total  
     Cash -3.5 2-5.5 -2.9 -6.5 -4.5
     Accruals -3.5 -5.5 -3.3 -8.4 -3.5
Primary  
     Cash -2.5 -4.1 -1.5 -4.8 -0.5
 
Accruals -2.5 -4.1 -1.9 -6.7 0.5
 
Memorandum item: 
 2
Interest payment 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 4
Source: National Bank of Romania 
 
 
 2. 5   The “policy shock” of 1997 and its consequences, 1997-1998 
  At the end of 1996 the economic situation was as follows: the monthly inflation 
rate was over 10 per cent; the consolidated budget deficit and the quasi-fiscal operations of 
the Central Bank were in excess of 8 per cent of GDP; the current account deficit was about 
7.4 per cent of GDP; and foreign exchange reserves were down to some $600 m, less than a 
month’s imports in spite of the large loans than had been raised in the international capital 
market.  At the same time, financial indiscipline (total arrears) had reached a magnitude that 
was causing serious concern (about 34 per cent of GDP), while inadequate steps were being 
taken toward privatization and restructuring.  Last but not least, the remonetization of the 
economy had allowed massive subsidies to be given to agriculture and other sectors in 1995 
and 1996 without raising inflation; as the remonetization process came to a halt in the latter 
half of 1996, maintaining subsidies without igniting inflation was to prove an impossible 
endeavor. 
  What happened in 1997?  The new government’s first step was to liberalize the 
foreign exchange market and the prices of certain goods which were still administratively 
regulated. Paradoxically, in a year when renewed efforts were made to achieve 
macroeconomic stabilization, the expected annual inflation rate, 90 per cent, was much 
higher than in 1996 (57per cent).  The explanation of this paradox lies in the magnitude of 
the effect of liberalizing prices and the anticipated devaluation of the leu.32  Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
32From some 4,000 lei/$1 at the end of December 1996 the rate rose sharply to about 9,000 lei/$1 in 
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assault upon several of the major imbalances led to some positive results: the foreign 
exchange market began to function adequately; the consolidated budget deficit (including 
formerly quasi-fiscal operations) was reduced to 3.7 per cent of GDP;33 the current account 
deficit shrank a little, from 7.2 per cent to 6.6 per cent of GDP; and the Central Bank’s 
foreign exchange reserves soared to about $2.6 billion.34  The size of the fiscal adjustment 
should also be seen against the backdrop of the sharp fall in output, which greatly reduced 
the tax base.  But despite all this, there was another side to the coin: the actual inflation rate 
was 151 per cent and GDP fell by much more than expected (6.6 per cent as against 2 per 
cent).  Both demand and supply shocks were behind the decline of the economy. 
  One consequence of the programme, which is not often mentioned, was its 
severe impact on the emerging private sector.  The large contraction of real credit lowered 
considerably the prospects for many small and medium-sized companies and was a major 
factor in the fall of output.  Thus, total real credit (in domestic and foreign currency) declined 
by 52.5 per cent and its non-government component by as much as 61.3 per cent.  This 
should be set against the growth of real credit in previous years when the non-government 
component increased by 19.7 per cent, 35.6 per cent, and 4.1 per cent in 1994, 1995, and 
1996, respectively.35  In many sectors sales fell by 20-25 per cent.  This development was 
the reason behind the growing chorus of demands in the private sector for fiscal relaxation, 
demands which became very intense during 1998.  Ironically, a programme which was 
meant to advance reforms, affected negatively the emerging entrepreneurial class and 
encouraged the expansion of the underground economy because of the degree of austerity 
involved. 
  There are several factors that explain the high rate of inflation. First, the 
corrective component of inflation (price de-control plus a rise in some administered prices) 
came strongly into play in March when inflation reached almost 30 per cent.  Secondly, the 
overshooting of the leu.  Thirdly, the programme underestimated the role of monopolies and 
the slow response of supply as sources of inflation.  Another factor lay in the economic 
policy slippage in the latter half of the year when there was a premature relaxation of 
monetary policy: there was an extensive and abrupt indexation of wages, redundancy 
payments were granted to laid-off workers, and large amounts of money were pumped into 
banks that were in difficulty.  It was obvious that the macroeconomic policy mix was not 
well balanced and that the supply side response had been greatly overestimated. 
  Belated moves were made to restructure some of the major “producers” of 
arrears.  The delay was due to the inherent problems of undertaking such an operation in a 
year when the economy was in steep decline: on the one hand, the overall measures aimed at 
restructuring implied the need for layoffs, but on the other hand, the troubles confronting the 
small and medium-sized enterprises in the private sector, a direct consequence of the 
austerity measures, were discouraging the creation of new job opportunities.  Privatization of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
late February 1997, after which a nominal appreciation took place and the rate stabilized at around 
7,000 lei/$1. 
33This is an overstatement to the extent that arrears stood at a high level and even increased.  The 
bail-out of Banca Agricola and Bancorex in 1997 indicated how serious the problem of arrears was 
and how they can obscure quasi-fiscal deficits. 
34Significant amounts of portfolio capital entered the country, which tested the ability of the Central 
Bank to sterilize them when base money represented no more then 4.6-4.7 per cent of GDP. 
35National Bank of Romania data. 
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large enterprises dragged on at a snail’s pace and as for bank privatization, the various 
projects were left in abeyance.  Such a situation could not provide incentives for direct 
foreign investment nor promote restructuring. 
  In the last months of 1997 the big losses of state banks, accumulated over a long 
period and mirroring the state of the real economy, attracted increasing attention.  In the last 
quarter of the year, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance converted 8,000 billion lei 
($1 billion) of poor credits granted by the Agricultural Bank and Bancorex into government 
bonds as a way of recapitalizing the two banks.  While the Dacia Felix and the Credit Bank 
failures were caused by large-scale fraud and embezzlement, the failure of the state banks 
was the result of a chronic misallocation of resources and of poor performance in a number 
of large economic sectors, which in turn was due to slow restructuring and feeble capital 
inflows.36 
  GDP continued to decline in 1998, according to preliminary data, by almost 7% 
per cent.  At the end of the year unemployment stood at about 10 per cent (as against 6.6 per 
cent in December 1996).  Inflation in December (year-on-year) fell to 40.6 per cent, and the 
consolidated budget deficit was kept to just below 4 per cent.  The latter should be seen 
against the background of a further reduction of the tax base (because of the fall in output) 
and the implications for government spending of the rescue package for the two state-owned 
banks.  Actually, the budget deficit was kept under control by a very severe cut in public 
expenditure undertaken in August. 
  Real interest rates stayed high in 199837 as a result of the tight monetary 
conditions and a lack of sufficient credibility in macroeconomic policy.  Their level indicated 
how small was the room for maneuver available to policy-makers.  Interestingly, real credit 
started to grow again in 1998 although output did not.  Between December 1997 and 
November 1998 real domestic credit rose by some 24 per cent with the non-government 
component increasing even more.  A note of caution is needed here, however, since over the 
same period, the net foreign assets of the banking system fell by almost a half and the real 
money supply shrank (see table 1) --which indicates no resumption of remonetization. 
  Based on consumer prices, the exchange rate appreciated in real terms by about 
30 per cent since mid-1997 (after the sharp devaluation at the start of that year), which helps 
to explain the rising trade and current account deficits in 1998.  The foreign exchange 
reserves of the National Bank declined to less than 1.9 billion at the end of the year, a result 
of its interventions to stem the fall of the leu.  It should also be mentioned, that excessively 
lax income policies also help to explain the size of domestic absorption in a year when there 
was a further contraction of output.  Real wages actually grew by about 4.7 per cent in the 
year to December (table 1). 
  The fallout from the financial crisis in Russia led to the postponement of new 
external bond issues, and cast doubt on the possibility of rolling over a portion of the 
external debt in 1999.  Because of the size of payments due in 1999 (about $2.9 billion) there 
is a threat of a financial crisis and default unless an agreement with the international financial 
                                                          
36Behind these developments was the slow pace of privatization which therefore failed to attract 
capital inflows and thereby help restructuring. 
37In the second half of the year ex post US dollar returns on three-month T-bills hovered at about 50 
per cent. 
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organizations is reached early in 1999.  This threat explains the considerable efforts to 
conclude privatization deals at the end of 1998 (Romtelecom, Romanian Development Bank, 
etc.) and the attempt to close down large loss-making companies. 
 
2.6  A comparison of the two stabilization programmes, 1994-1995 and 1997-1998 
 
  There are several features which differentiate the two attempts at macroeconomic 
stabilization in 1994-1995 (hereafter policy A) and in 1997-1998 (policy B).  These 
differences help to explain why output grew, albeit on a very fragile basis, during the first 
attempt whereas it declined in 1997 and 1998.  It should be stressed that in both cases the 
pace of restructuring was feeble. 
  Both policies were accompanied by interest-rates shocks.  However, policy A did 
not involve a credit crunch; on the contrary, M2 grew rapidly and so did lending.  As was 
mentioned already, this was due to the rapid remonetization of the economy, which was 
enhanced by a psychological factor: for the first time people found it worthwhile to put their 
savings into banks (because of positive real interest rates).  Consequently, bank deposits 
grew rapidly.  The psychological-cum-savings reorientation factors were no longer strong in 
the second period, and the sharp rise in interest rates (in 1997) could not be accompanied by 
remonetization.  Policy B, as a matter of fact, involved a major credit crunch. 
  It should also be emphasized that the process of remonetization came to a halt in 
the second half of 1996, which created a major constraint for policy in 1997.  The increase in 
the velocity of money forced policy-makers to consider a much tighter monetary policy.  The 
issue at stake was how much tighter it should be. 
  Policy B involved exchange rate unification via a large overshooting of the leu, 
which magnified inflation and the decline of money balances in real terms.  Policy A 
included multiple exchange rates and controls on key prices such as energy. 
Policy B involved a major fiscal adjustment, including a large reduction in explicit and implicit subsidies, which 
affected certain sectors more heavily than others. 
Policy B used as a nominal anchor base money (which actually recovered its 1996 December level in the second 
quarter of 1997), whereas policy A was quite eclectic, relying on both the control of the money supply and a certain 
degree of stability in the exchange rate38 during the phase of intense remonetization. 
Macroeconomic imbalances persisted, or even developed, over the 1994-1996 period.  Arrears rose to over 34 
per cent of GDP in 1996 (from an average of 22-23 per cent in previous years), which was increasingly worrisome 
since, as the economy had been growing, restructuring should have been encouraged.  A factor here is that policy-
makers ignored the need for a restructuring policy, an industrial policy conceived as a damage-control device.39  The 
growth of arrears indicated the unsound basis of economic growth.  The rising trade deficits in 1995 and 1996 were 
financed by substantial compensating capital inflows, which created a dangerous situation for the following years.  
With the benefit of hindsight, one can imagine various scenarios against the backdrop of the world financial crisis. 
                                                          
38The plural “exchange rates” is emphasized since a de facto quasi-unification of the rates occurred 
during 1994.  The relative stability of the rates helped the stabilization effort at that time. 
39An industrial policy, seen as managing the gradual phasing-out of chronically inefficient companies, 
was advocated in my ‘Transformation and the Legacy of Backwardness’, Économies et Sociétés, 
No.44, May 1992, pp. 181-206. 
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Policy B tried to speed up privatization and used the Stock Market to this end.  This explains the large inflows 
of portfolio capital in the first half of 1997 and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the Central Bank.  
In 1997 Romania, for the first time, received substantial autonomous capital inflows, which tested the sterilization 
capacity of the central bank.  These flows later subsided as policy ran into an impasse. 
An apparent puzzle comes out of comparing the two programmes.  In the period 1994-1996 the trade and the 
current account deficits rose in the wake of the expanding economy.  With the very severe compression of domestic 
absorption in 1997 and 1998 an improvement in the current account deficit might have been expected.  There was a 
slight reduction of the deficit in 1997 (as against 1996), but it started to grow again in 1998.  The fact is that, after a 
fall in GDP of more than 13 per cent in just two years, the current account deficit remained in the vicinity of 7 per 
cent of GDP.  The immediate explanation is that this was due to the real appreciation of the exchange rate and the 
lax incomes policy in 1998.  
Whether the fall in output could have been smaller, or even avoided, in 1997 can only be a matter for 
speculation.  It is clear nonetheless that, owing to very tight credit conditions, a continuation of growth was hardly 
possible and this is why the programme anticipated a decline of 2 per cent in GDP.  One policy issue for analysis is 
the appropriateness of the nominal reduction of base money in the first quarter of 1997, instead, for instance, of 
keeping Mo fixed for a while.  The reasons for the reduction – a rising velocity of money and the desire to mitigate 
the size of the correction in the price level – are plausible but not indisputable.  In addition, the appropriateness of 
moving at the same time on two tracks, the cut in Mo and floating the exchange rate, can be questioned.  It is 
possible to conceive of a sequence of moves so that the floating of the exchange rate would have followed the 
correction of the inflationary surge that had been set off by the too rapid expansion of base money in late 1996.  
There might also have been a closer and more critical look at the size of tariff reductions proposed for agriculture.  
The conclusion is that policy-makers underestimated the scale and extent of supply rigidities in the economy. 
As for the 1994-1995 programme, it should again be emphasized that the slow pace of privatization and 
restructuring damaged its effectiveness.  A faster rate of privatization, and consequently more capital inflows, 
especially of FDI, could have changed significantly the structure of the economy.  Even if the then Government had 
not allowed the official exchange rate to float, a dual system – a commercial rate with rationing, and a free rate for 
financial transactions – could have created an exit window for potential foreign investors in the local equity market.  
The Government might have also used the favorable circumstances of an expanding economy to deal with the large 
loss-making units.  The failure to do so represents a missed opportunity. 
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2.7   What next? 
 
In early 1999 Romania faces three major inter-linked threats and policy challenges: the risk of an external 
payments default;40 the danger of a banking crisis owing to the scale of bad loans in the banking system and the size 
of the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, which were less than base money and insufficient to stem a run 
on the banks;41 and a possible financial crisis as a result of persistently high real interest rates and the consequences 
of a further bail-out of Bancorex (about $400 million in December 1998).  Other important constraints on policy are 
social and policy fatigue,42 and an increasingly unfavorable external environment. 
In February 1999 the Parliament approved a budget that envisages a deficit of 2 per cent of GDP and which 
relies on a rise in taxation and further cuts in expenditure.43 The letter of intent signed with the IMF, in April, 
condones a bigger deficit, of 2.7%.  The big unknown in the whole picture, however, is the real quasi-fiscal deficit in 
the economy which is hidden by arrears and the accumulation of bad loans to enterprises.  What happened with 
Bancorex and Banca Agricola is an illustration of the result of years of weak restructuring, which shows up in the 
balance sheets of the banks44 and, ultimately, in the consolidated budget deficit when the “day of reckoning” cannot 
be postponed any longer. 
In the short run, in order to avoid default on external payments, it is essential for the Government to reach an 
agreement with the IMF and the World Bank.  The difficulties of concluding such agreements stem from the 
requirements of further drastic cuts in the consolidated budget deficit and of finding resources to finance substantial 
restructuring in a year when GDP is expected to fall again.  As already mentioned, a very critical challenge for 
policy is to avert a banking crisis.  Over the longer term, the Government needs to design a strategy which will help 
the export-orientation of the economy, lead to better management of the external debt, and create conditions for 
sustainable economic growth. 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
A command system allocates resources inefficiently because of the impossibility of economic calculation. 
Consequently,  the freeing of prices and the functional opening of the economy put the latter under tremendous 
strain when resource reallocation cannot take place quickly enough and without friction. Strain is augmented by 
congenital institutional fragility. 
The magnitude of the required resource reallocation can seriously undermine the attempt to pursue a low 
inflation rate in the short run, particularly if the lack of capital markets, the presence of large and growing budget 
deficits, low savings rates, and meagre foreign capital inflows and external aid are taken into account.  In a system 
subject to substantial strain there are strong forces that create a high propensity to generate inflation as a way of 
diffusing tension by spreading out, or putting off, the costs of adjustment; another effect of strain are massive inter-
enterprise arrears, which appear as a sui generis, and unintended financial innovation and create a structural trap for 
stabilization policy.  The inflation tax and negative real interest rates are implicit subsidies for those that are unable 
to make ends meet financially in a competitive environment.   
Analysts have frequently highlighted the relatively tighter financial discipline in countries such as Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, as compared with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, or Romania. It is suggested here 
that an explanation is provided by looking at the structure of the former economies,45 their ability to export to 
western markets and to attract foreign investment, their size, their economic policies, and not least, geography.  
Furthermore, structure is influenced by whether or not there was a history of partial reforms (that, in some cases, 
                                                          
40Despite a moderate level of external debt (which does not exceed 30 per cent of GDP), it has 
nevertheless been increasing rapidly.  Questions, however, can be raised about the management of 
the external debt, with a peak payment approaching $2.9 billion in 1999. 
41At the start of 1998 the $500 limit to the purchase of hard currency by individuals was lifted.  This 
measure may increase the risk of a run on the banking system. 
42The result of an austerity policy under way for two years in which GDP has fallen by more than 13 
per cent. 
43Particularly worrisome are the low shares in the state budget of expenditure on education and 
healthcare, and the plunging share of capital expenditure (especially on infrastructure). 
44According to data made public by the National Bank, non-performing loans were above 60%  of total 
outstanding loans in June 1998, with much of it belonging to the large state owned banks. 
45A World Bank study shows the median number of employees in a sample of firms in Romania to be 
1,327, whereas in other countries it was very low: Slovenia, 213; Poland, 820; Hungary, 241; 
Bulgaria, 291. 
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brought about several of the ingredients of a market environment), the degree of concentration of industry, and the 
prior existence of a private sector.  Policy credibility can be singled out as a major explanatory factor, but credibility 
itself depends on how much structural adjustment can be brought about by that policy over a stated period; and the 
capacity to adjust is influenced by the initial structure and the scale of resource misallocation that it contains. 
If it is accepted that the roots of financial indiscipline are to be sought in structure however multifaceted and the 
strain to which the economy is subjected, the obvious conclusion is that both structure and strain have to be targeted 
by policy.  Dealing with structure includes a focus on both property rights and corporate governance.  Also attention 
must be paid to the development of appropriate and effective market institutions and to finding ways to erode the 
existing economic power structure and to change enterprise behavior.  Strain, which reflects the scale of the required 
resource reallocation, should be approached by starting with the simple truth that structural adjustment is always 
difficult even in an advanced market-based economy and even when reform is credible.46 
The Romanian experience is a glaring example of the importance of structural reforms, of reducing the 
structural distortions of the economy for durable macroeconomic stabilization. At the same time, is proof of the 
pains of such reforms. Unless financial discipline (hard budget constraints) is (are) imposed, the pressure on the 
central bank and on the banking sector in general, becomes a constant feature of the way the system does function, 
which also proliferates into wide-ranging rent-seeking (demand for cheap credit). Here one sees the combination of 
the pressure exerted by those who cannot pay at the new relative prices with that of those who do not wish to pay for 
‘it pays not to pay’ (the moral hazard issue). Another lesson of this experience is the link between privatization, 
capital inflows, and restructuring. With the benefit of hindsight it can be asserted that the magnitude of required 
resource reallocation assigns a special role to foreign capital in helping reallocate resources and in imposing 
financial discipline in the system. 
Where policy is inconsistent, privatization is slow, and foreign direct investment is non-significant, high strain 
persists; it undermines macroeconomic stabilization and preserves the flow problem of the banking industry. Here a 
dangerous vicious circle can be at work between macroeconomic policy and the state of the banking system. Thus, 
unless there is deep restructuring of the economy, both tightening and expansionary policies can be ambivalent as to 
their impact on banks; expansions can be accompanied by poor lending and unsustainable trade imbalances (as it 
happened in the second half of 1995 and in 1996), whereas high real interest rates (as during 1997-1998) can 
damage the payment capacity of banks and enterprises and unleash mounting pressure for forgiveness. 
Unless authorities can create and maintain a momentum of policy steadiness, the feeling of overall uncertainty 
and volatility is unlikely to be mitigated. Although stop and go measures can hardly be avoided under the 
circumstances, large policy fluctuations are detrimental to economy; they entail large income transfers among 
economic sectors and groups of population, and unnerve expectations instead of stabilizing them. Think only about 
the dynamic of inflation in recent years: from about 200% and 295% in 1992 and 1993, respectively, to cca. 62% in 
1994,  28% in 1995, 57% in 199647 , 151 in 1997, and 40.6% in 1998. This dynamic was accompanied by dramatic 
shifts in interest rates - from highly negative, during 1990-1993, to highly positive levels in 1994 and in subsequent 
years.  
If  the level of positive real interest rates would continue to be quite high (in the absence of substantial 
restructuring and of the reduction of the fuzziness of the environment) this will be detrimental to long-term 
investments and would skew the composition of foreign capital inflows in favor of portfolio capital. It would also 
damage the longer-term prospects for banks since high spreads do not help their clients and intensify  adverse 
selection.  
Without deep restructuring high real interest rates will maintain intense strain in the system and make it prone to 
instability.  In this context, the situation of potentially viable enterprises, but which are burdened with heavy debts, 
should be considered more creatively.  It should be kept in mind that many companies are heavily in debt because 
they were under-capitalized (without working capital) by design, and not by choice, as was the case of firms in 
South East Asia.  The fact is that tight monetary conditions and high real interest rates can kill even potentially 
viable companies.  One way of reducing this risk would be to distinguish between past and current payments.  On 
past debts the interest rate paid could be composed of two elements: the registered inflation rate and the real interest 
prevailing on international markets; whereas current interest rates should apply only to current payments.48  
Something along this line could mitigate the plight of many potentially sound companies. 
                                                          
46 M. Bruno, (December 1992), “Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe:  A Preliminary 
Evaluation”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 39,4, pp.753. 
47 Inflation rates are recorded end of the year. 
48See my article “What to do about high real interest rates?”, Ziarul Financiar (in Romanian),  24 
March, 1999. Martin Feldstein has proposed something similar for Asian companies hurt by the high 
real interest rates resulting from austerity measures.  M. Feldstein,  “All is not lost for the won”, Wall 
Street Journal, June 4, 1998. 
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Apart from the extraordinary pressure exerted by strain the fuzziness of the environment impacts people’s 
behavior and causes short-termism  Fuzziness and uncertainty explain also why banks have a very low propensity to 
provide long-term credit, a phenomenon enhanced by low domestic savings49.  
Large policy fluctuations can easily lead to a boom and bust evolution of the economy. The economic dynamics 
in post-communist Romania show the difficulty the policy-makers has had in setting a corridor of policy steadiness 
and its reactive stance most of the time.  
Institutions determine ultimately economic performance. Institutions, understood as socially accepted rules and 
procedures, determine the quality of economic policy and of its choices as well. However, institutions cannot be 
created by ‘hocus pocus economics’; particularly in the case of post-communist economies, one can detect the 
tension between constructivism and organicism in fostering institutional change. 
Romania’s experience shows that natura non facit saltus, that making institutions function properly takes time, 
and that there is a grip of structure - as the product of history - that is hard to loosen.  It would be naive to assume 
that the institutions of the post-communist economies can quickly and easily perform according to the various role 
models of Western Europe or North America; they need time to develop in order to perform effectively.  Realism is 
needed not only in designing policies, but also in making balanced judgements as to “what constitutes good 
performance” and “what is to be done next”. 
 
Appendix1: Strain  in a transforming economy. A formal analysis 
 
In a transforming economy, the origin of strain can be traced to two main sources: the fragility of institutions in 
the making and the magnitude of the required reallocation of resources (Daianu, 1994, 1997). In what follows the 
focus is put on the second factor, namely, the ability of the system to react rapidly - via resource reallocation - to the 
new set of market-clearing prices. 
The magnitude of the required resource reallocation can be illustrated by the ratio: 
(2) J 0 
p q q
p q
i
*
i
*
i
i
*
i
*
= −∑∑
where (p*) and (q*) refer to equilibrium values, whereas (p) and (q) correspond to the current (distorted) 
resource allocation. J can be viewed as a measure of aggregate disequilibrium (in the system) as against the vector of 
equilibrium prices and quantities. 
The size of the above ratio measures the strain within the system and reflects the magnitude of aggregate 
disequilibrium. It can be assumed that the possible level of unemployment is related to the degree of strain in the 
system: the higher is strain (resource misallocation) the higher is the unemployment that would be brought about by 
the required resource reallocation –when job creation is not intense. This is a major reason which lies behind the 
temptation to tolerate high inflation rates as a way to diffuse the tension within a system. Strain can be mitigated by: 
inter-enterprise arrears, monopoly pricing, explicit and implicit subsidies, spill-over effects, the elimination of 
negative value-added activities, learning, and last, but not least, the efficiency reserves of producers, exporting it.  
The more numerous are those who would lose their jobs because of the needed resource reallocation the more 
intense would be the opposition against it, against restructuring.  
Another way of portraying strain is to focus on the scope of the required process of overall income (wages) 
readjustment, which should fit the new market-clearing prices. The modified form of J’ that builds on wages is: 
(2) J'
n w w
n w
i i
*
i
i i
= −∑∑ 0 
where n denotes labour in sector (i), and wi*  and w i  refer to equilibrium and actual wage, respectively, for the 
sector (i). Σni =N, where N refers to all labour resources. For the inefficient, subsidized (explicitly, or implicitly) 
sectors actual wage exceeds the marginal productivity of labour: wi > dqi /dni . The higher is J’, i.e., the higher is 
strain, the more fierce would be the distribution struggle. The difference between equilibrium and actual wages 
reflects the resource transfer (subsidies) practiced by the system; the higher is this difference the stronger will be the 
forces that oppose change. 
                                                          
49 In 1998 aggregate savings were cca.9% of GDP in Romania. 
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In an OECD study50 the level of strain in labor market adjustment is compared with other countries (Table 3). 
The equilibrium level was defined, in a somewhat arbitrary way, as the structure of relative wages (on the price side) 
and employment (on the quantity side) in the U.K. for the year 1994 (latest data available). Another benchmark 
country could be used; the essential results do not change dramatically if, for example, France was chosen instead of 
the U.K. The results suggest four main points: 
i) As expected, the distance between the U.K. and the transition countries, in particular Romania, is much 
higher than the distance vis-à-vis a country like France. It is important to confirm this basic and 
intuitive result before pursuing further the interpretation of the indicator. 
ii) The level of strain in Romania is much higher for the employment structure than for relative wages. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Romania had by 1995 a much closer relative wage structure to the UK than 
other countries in transition. 
iii) However, the overall required adjustment (combining the price and quantity sides) is the highest in 
Romania. 
iv) Finally, without the agricultural sector, the structure of the Romanian economy would appear much 
closer to the other countries in transition. 
This indicator confirms some of the features of the Romanian economy. Notably, the legacy of the 
previous economic structure appears to be particularly heavy in Romania at least when compared with 
other transition countries in central and Eastern Europe. This may explain why there has been so much 
resistance to structural change; and, also, why inflation and inter-enterprise arrears have become a way 
of diffusing the pressure in the system when unemployment was not allowed to exceed a certain upper 
limit (for political reasons) and when non-inflationary means for financing the budget were hardly 
available. 
                                                          
50 “Romania- Macroeconomic stabilization and restructuring, social policy”, OECD Economic Surveys, 
Paris, 1998, pp.169-172 
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Table 3 Levels of strain in labour market adjustment 
     Romania Hungary Poland Czech Rep. Slovakia Slovenia Fra
nc 
UK 
 199
0 
199
5 
199
2 
199
5 
199
2 
199
5 
199
1 
199
5 
199
1 
199
5 
199
3 
199
5 
199
2 
199
4 
Relative wages (average monthly earnings = 100) 
Agriculture and forestry 104.
2 
81.6 68.9         76.8 82.3 90.6 97.2 84.2 99.7 81.7 105.
3 
95.5 72.5 77.9 
Industry 98.6      107.
6 
99.0 104.
0 
98.7 108.
9 
104.
5 
99.2 101.
4 
104.
3 
84.9 85.0 111.
1 
116.
5 
Constructions 110.
9 
106.
4 
90.2      84.4 106.
1 
92.5 106.
2 
108.
0 
102.
4 
104.
8 
83.0 82.5 98.6 109.
2 
Trade, hotel and restaurant 86.1          78.2 97.0 90.0 90.3 88.9 85.8 88.2 89.3 94.0 102.
2 
99.8 90.9 69.9 
Transport, communications 108.
5 
121.
0 
105.
8 
106.
5 
102.
1 
101.
2 
102.
1 
100.
7 
102.
1 
108.
4 
115.
0 
110.
9 
105.
4 
144.
6 
Financial banking and insurance, 
real estate and other services 
109.
3 
126.
8 
144.
7 
137.
4 
147.
7 
137.
3 
99.9 130.
7 
103.
9 
131.
4 
143.
8 
124.
6 
128.
0 
136.
8 
Education, health and social 
assistance 
96.5          85.3 93.5 86.5 86.9 81.7 93.2 91.2 97.6 87.2 111.
8 
109.
6 
75.8 53.0 
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Public adm. and defense, other 
branches 
88.9    88.6 118.
0 
111.
3 
115.
7 
108.
9 
88.5 103.
8 
103.
4 
102.
5 
127.
8 
132.
7 
91.0 93.6
Index of “strain” on prices 23.0 9.8 24.1          19.7 18.3 17.0 21.1 19.1 23.8 17.2 33.9 33.1 11.7  
       (excluding  agriculture) 21.2 12.9 26.0          21.3 22.9 18.1 21.2 20.0 24.0 18.6 34.5 34.8 12.0  
Employment shares (%)               
Agriculture and forestry 29.0            34.4 11.4 8.1 25.5 22.6 12.1 6.6 15.8 9.2 10.7 10.4 5.2 2.0 
Industry 36.9            28.6 30.2 27.1 25.2 25.9 41.0 33.2 35.9 30.3 38.7 38.0 20.6 20.2 
Constructions 6.5            5.0 5.4 6.0 6.6 6.1 5.7 9.2 8.2 8.6 5.4 5.1 7.2 6.4 
Trade, hotel and restaurant 6.87            10.4 14.8 15.9 10.7 13.6 7.8 15.7 8.1 13.1 14.6 15.4 17.4 20.8 
Transport, communications2 7.0            5.9 8.6 8.8 5.5 5.8 9.0 7.7 5.5 7.8 6.5 5.9 5.8 5.8 
Financial banking and insurance, 
Real estate and other services 
3.9            4.2 5.2 5.9 1.3 2.0 5.4 6.7 5.4 5.8 4.6 6.1 10.8 12.5 
Education, health and social 
assistance 
6.7            8.1 13.6 15.6 13.1 13.3 13.8 12.1 16.5 14.5 10.2 11.4 6.9 14.5 
Public adm. and defense, other 
branches 
3.1             3.4 10.6 12.5 12.1 10.7 5.1 8.8 4.6 10.7 9.2 7.6 26.2 17.9
 
Index of “strain” on quantities 91.4 76.6 47.6          37.2 60.4 56.7 68.1 47.1 68.7 45.9 62.2 56.7 13.8  
 
 
    
21
Romanian Center for Economic Policies 
           (excluding agriculture) 76.4 57.5 41.5          33.7 46.0 42.4 63.1 44.4 63.4 43.2 52.9 48.3 21.8  
Indicator of total “strain” 94.2 77.2 53.3            42.1 63.1 59.2 71.3 50.8 72.6 49.0 70.9 65.6 18.1
    (excluding agriculture) 79.3 59.0 49.0            39.9 51.4 46.1 66.6 48.7 67.8 47.0 63.2 59.5 24.9
  Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Romania, Paris, 1998, pp.171 
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Appendix 2:  A symptom of systemic strain: inter-enterprise arrears 
Inter-enterprise arrears reflect strain in a post-command economy. As temporary quasi-inside money, inter-
enterprise arrears endogenize the money supply growth in a perverse way and emasculate monetary policy to a 
significant extent. Concerning inter-enterprise arrears in post-command economies, there are other explanations to 
highlight: the fuzzy state of property rights (Khan and Clifton, 1993), the primitive state of the financial system 
(Ickes and Rytermann, 1992), the real credit squeeze (Calvo and Coricelli), and the lack of policy credibility 
(Rostowski, 1994). In what follows I will use a very simple model in order to underline strain in explaining inter-
enterprise arrears. 
Let us suppose that the output of an agent is an increasing function of market discipline visualised as a public 
good, or as a positive externality – as a means for easing the efficient allocation of resources. Market (financial) 
discipline emerges as a public good and as a positive externality because of collective (generalized) good behavior. 
The state does not supply it, though it can influence its production by the enforcement of bankruptcy procedures and 
the provision of other institutional means. Nonetheless, the state action (policy) of enforcement becomes irrelevant 
when collective good behavior is impossible for various reasons, and, as it is our contention, because of strain in the 
main. 
Were market disciplines perfect and resource reallocation fast enough, inter-enterprise arrears would not exist; 
any inefficiency would be promptly penalized. Should inter-enterprise arrears arise however, they would harm 
creditors – a fact which would be reflected by their output. Taking as a working hypothesis immediate resource 
reallocation, it can be assumed that the production of agent (i) is: 
qi = q + c · g  for the agents who do not cause arrears 
   = q   for the agents who cause arrears 
 
Another assumption is that the level of financial discipline (g) – seen as a 
positive externality – is determined by n and t, where (t) indicates whether agents pay 
their debts, and (n) refers to those who do not cause arrears. A final assumption is that 
c<1<N, where N>1/c. 
Multiple equilibrium situations can be imagined depending on agents’ 
behavior and the existence of financial discipline as a public good. If agents pay their 
debts in due time, their incomes show up as q+c g-t, whereas if they produce arrears, 
their earnings appear as simply (q). The decision for an enterprise is to cause arrears if  
c·g = c·nt<t or, n<1/c, i.e., when the number of those who pay in due time is low. A 
conclusion would follow: when policy credibility is low, and when financial 
discipline is widely disregarded, agents are tempted to produce arrears. Instead, if 
n=N agent N is stimulated to pay debts since n=N>1/c, as our assumption says. 
It would seem that everything boils down to policy credibility, to the 
functioning of market discipline. However, a critical question arises. What is going to 
happen, and what can be done if the number of those who do not pay is high and, 
what is even more important, non-payment is the result of the lack of capacity to pay. 
This means that non-payment is not an opportunistic response to the existing 
circumstances concerning market (financial) discipline, or the low policy credibility. 
Consequently, whichever is the determination of decision-makers to pursue a policy 
course, the sheer number of those who cannot pay makes n<1/c – and thus, the vicious 
circle of arrears comes into being. 
Moreover, the working hypothesis should be made more realistic by assuming 
that resource reallocation is slow. In this case, a complete exit of the inefficient but, 
still, positive value-added enterprises would mean that output is substantially less than 
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if arrears emerge in the system. Consequently, the short-run production function of an 
agent could be redefined as: 
 
qi  = q + c·g  no arrears and immediate resource reallocation  
     = q  arrears and no, or very slow reallocation of resources 
= q - k  no arrears and no, or very slow reallocation of resources – the 
case of an efficient agent 
= 0  no arrears (full exit) and no resource reallocation - the case of an 
inefficient agent 
 
where k indicates the fall of output when there is full exit. It is clear that, under the circumstances, the second 
situation (that includes arrears) appears as a preferred solution for the short term. It should be stressed that the choice 
of agents is influenced – in most cases – by their wage fund-centred goal function. 
Therefore, when resource reallocation is very slow and when the number of those who cannot pay – because of 
the lack of capacity to pay – is high, policy credibility cannot be the main factor behind the growth of arrears; the 
main factor is represented by the large number of enterprises which, at the new equilibrium prices, would have to get 
out of the economic circuit. Since such a huge exit is impossible inter-enterprise arrears emerge as a symptom of 
strain in the system and as a way to diffuse strain. 
 
 
    
24
